This article investigates pollution permit auctions that incorporate allowance reserves. In these auctions the sale of a fixed quantity of permits is supplemented by an additional permit reserve. This reserve automatically releases permits if a sufficiently high price is triggered. The main justifications for implementing an allowance reserve are to reduce price volatility as well as assisting in cost containment. We show-paradoxically-that incorporating an allowance reserve into a permit auction can decrease firms' payoffs, increase the clearing price, and increase compliance costs. This has implications for all major cap-and-trade markets, including the US Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative.
Introduction
Cap-and-trade markets are now a common regulatory instrument to control pollution. Behind this enthusiastic adoption is the core economic rationale of least-cost pollution control: the aggregate costs of pollution control are minimized by allowing firms to trade a fixed number of pollution permits. Although regulation is apparently least-cost, current regulators have real concerns about the prohibitive costs to industry. The potential for price volatility-and therefore increased (and uncertain) industry costs-has placed the issue of cost containment at the center of policy debates (Tatsutani and Pizer, 2008) . Many regulators have implemented cost-containment procedures to reduce firms' compliance costs and ensure strong industry support. One such mechanism is the so-called allowance reserve, which provides the market with a fixed reserve of permits that can be released if a threshold permit price is triggered (Murray et al., 2009). 1 This mechanism is now common practice in major cap-and-trade markets, which include the Cost Containment Reserve (CCR) of the US Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), the Market Stability Reserve (MSR) of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS), and the Allowance Price Containment Reserve (APCR) of the Californian Cap-and-Trade Program (AB-32).
Within these cap-and-trade markets, a second structural change has been observed; the process of initial permit allocation is moving away from free allocation towards auctioning. Until very recently, the auctions that did exist tended to follow a very standard format: a multi-unit auction with a fixed number of permits. Importantly, however, many of these auction formats have been modified to include the existence of an allowance reserve. Thus in some schemes-such as RGGI-the auction system now has endogenity in the supply of permits: firms' bids can now activate the release of additional permits. 2 Given the addition of an allowance reserve, it is a priori unclear how the auction equilibria will change. Having an additional supply of permits realized on reaching a trigger price may have consequences for firms' equilibrium bidding strategies, revenue generation, and the functioning of the permit market. Given that both the auctioning of permits and the presence of an allowance reserve are prevalent in contemporary cap-and-trade markets, it is important to consider how these two institutional structures interact and the implications for cost containment.
In this article we investigate a permit auction under the presence of an allowance reserve. We model a permit auction in which the supply of permits can be increased if the clearing price reaches a threshold trigger price. We provide firms' equilibrium bidding strategies, as well as the implications for the regulator's revenue and auction clearing prices. We find that for a class of symmetric subgameperfect equilibria, implementing an auction with allowance reserve may, in fact, decrease firms' expected payoffs and increase the clearing price relative to an auction without allowance reserve. Intuitively, the introduction of an allowance reserve distorts firms' demand schedules. As a result, for clearing prices below the trigger price, the allowance reserve is not activated. This could lead to a lower level of permit allocation (and identical price) relative to an standard auction: firms' payoffs are strictly lower under the implementation of an allowance reserve. This scenario is very likely to occur: as we prove in this article, clearing prices above the trigger price do not constitute an equilibrium. Indeed, further support arises as we additionally show that there exists only one equilibrium where the allowance reserve is actually used, and this occurs when the clearing price is equal to the trigger price. Interestingly, in this one equilibrium the allowance reserve is completely exhausted, which suggests we are unlikely to observe partially used reserves in reality. Our model predictions fit the experiences of the US Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI).
In our framework the regulator sets a reserve price, quantity of allowance reserve, and a threshold trigger price: all three parameters are set prior to the auction and are common knowledge to all firms. If the initial clearing price is larger than the trigger price, then the reserve quantity is released until either the clearing price becomes equal to the trigger price or the whole reserve exhausts. To investigate this, we advance the framework of a multi-unit uniform-price auction, where bidders simultaneously submit their demand schedules. In such a setting the regulator aggregates the demand schedules then determines the clearing price. This core process is frequently used in the auctioning of financial securities, pollution permits, and energy products (Ausubel and Cramton, 2004) . The popularity of uniform-price auctions continues even though it is well known that they have inefficient equilibria: bidders' optimal strategies may result in a reduction of their actual demand functions and consequently the clearing price is lower than the equivalent Walrasian equilibrium price (e.g., Wilson, 1979; Back and Zender, 1993; Wang and Zender, 2002; Ausubel et al., 2014) . The majority of literature on multi-unit auctions focuses on fixed supply, yet a small sub-field now considers variable supply (Hansen, 1988; Lengwiler, 1999; Back and Zender, 2001; LiCalzia and Pavan, 2005; McAdams, 2007; Montero, 2008; Damianov and Becker, 2010) . Although this sub-field of literature allows the auction supply to vary, the choice of quantity is generally unrestricted and is often chosen to maximize the seller's payoff. In contrast to this literature, we provide an alternative framework with two distinct features. First, in our setting the reserve quantity for sale is restricted due to policy (and political) design. Thus, unlike the existing literature, the choice of additional supply cannot be determined after the bids have been submitted. Second, the additional supply is based on conditionality: the additional quantity will only be released for a sufficiently large aggregate demand schedule. Thus we provide the first analysis of a multi-unit auction with a trigger price and fixed reserve. Using our framework, we provide a paradoxical result; namely, introducing a cost containment reserve may actually decrease firms' payoffs and increase the price of permits and the associated costs of compliance. As many permit auctions are used for their price-discovery benefits, this distortion has the potential to generate incorrect price signals to market participants.
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Our model has similar structural characteristics to the auction process of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). 4 This market incorporates 9 Northeastern US states and controls greenhouse gases emitted from the power sector. Since its inception in 2008, quarterly auctions (with a reserve price) have initially allocated the permits. From the beginning of 2014, the auction mechanism was augmented to include a Cost Containment Reserve (CCR) (RGGI, 2013) . Initially the allowance reserve was set at 5 million permits then increased and sustained at 10 million permits each year thereafter (the allowance reserve is not transferable between years). The auction trigger price required to release the permits was set at $4 per CO 2 allowance in 2014 and $6 per CO 2 allowance in 2015. This trigger price increases to $8 and $10 per CO 2 allowance for the years 2016 and 2017, respectively, and increases by 2.5% per annum thereafter. As can be seen from Table 1 , the CCR has been fully exhausted in two auctions with the clearing prices fitting our predictions. The question then arises: how effective is the allowance reserve in controlling costs within the auction mechanism? 3 As explained by Ellerman et al. (2000) , the use of annual US EPA auctions for the Acid Rain Program helped to stimulate the permit market by generating early price signals, which could be used to assist in bilateral trade as well as providing new entrants with a secure method of permit allocation. Further evidence has been provided-for a range of auction types-that show permit auction clearing prices track underlying market conditions accurately (Burtraw et al., 2010a) . 4 For the preliminary auction design of RGGI see Holt et al. (2007) . An extensive debate exists over the effectiveness of allowance reserves. Proponents of these allowance reserves show that, under the presence of uncertainty, allowance reserves reduce the net present value of compliance costs. In particular Fell et al. (2012) shows, by using a stochastic dynamic framework, that an expansion of an allowance reserve reduces net present value of control costs, but at a diminishing rate.
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Further, on investigating the reserve within the EU-ETS, Fell (2015) finds that a reserve can help stabilize permit allocation price levels in a more cost-effective manner than scheduled permit allocation reductions.
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Due to the lowering of the net present value of compliance costs, it has thus been arguedfrom a political economy perspective-that an allowance reserve "may be able to bridge differences between environmental advocates seeking a cap on emissions and industrial interests concerned about costs" (Murray et al., 2009, p. 90) . From this perspective, then, the concept of a reserve has been developed as a politically viable version of a 'hard' price collar (safety valve) (Burtraw et al., 2010b; Fell and Morgenstern, 2010; Grüll and Taschini, 2011; Fell et al., 2012) .
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Yet there continues to be a controversial debate over the use of a reserve. For example, Borenstein et al. (2014, pp. 86-88) argues-in the context of the California AB-32 market-that in order to fully control price volatility the regulator should, instead, be ready to expand the reserve in order to limit the clearing price (akin to having a 'hard' price ceiling). 8 Indeed, as seen above in the context of RGGI, the allowance reserve has been completely exhausted each year, which may not effectively contain costs within the auction.
Throughout this debate, attention has-justifiably-focused on the ability of the allowance reserve to dampen cost shocks and aggregate compliance costs within the permit market. As such it has abstracted from the complex interactions between the allowance reserve and the auction mechanism. Yet given that 5 An important design issue is the source of permits within the allowance reserve. It is clear that, holding demand constant, if the permits are sourced from the current cap, then clearing prices may rise under the presence of an allowance reserve (Schatzki, 2012 ). Yet as this article proves, demand schedules endogenously change due to the inclusion of an allowance reserve. Murray et al. (2009) suggests permits can be sourced from future caps ("system borrowing") or allowing them to vanish if not used (thus establishing a range of potential long term caps).
6 Recently, however, Perkis et al. (2016) , Shobe et al. (2014) , and Holt and Shobe (2016) conducted laboratory experiments and found that 'soft' ceilings often did not perform well.
7 Hybrid approaches were first analyzed by Roberts and Spence (1976) and developed by Pizer (2002) . Recent approaches on price controls have incorporated issues relating to strategic behavior (Stocking, 2012) and compliance (Holland and Moore, 2013; Hasegawa and Salant, 2014) . 8 For an analysis of price volatility within the California AB-32 market see Borenstein et al. (2015) and for a discussion of the issues involved within permit auction design see Lopomo et al. (2011). auctions provide a major component of information dissemination (such as price discovery) within the market, it is important to consider the potential impact of an allowance reserve. In this article, then, we address this gap by focusing our attention on how an allowance reserve has the potential to alter the auction equilibria.
Our contribution is twofold. First, we establish a novel auction framework that incorporates an allowance reserve with a trigger price. We add to the literature by incorporating an auction supply mechanism that is both limited in size and has the characteristics of conditionality. This, therefore, extends the scope and potential applicability of multi-unit auctions with endogenous supply. Second, we advance the policy debate on allowance reserves by critically evaluating the potential consequences of a reserve within a permit auction. This article, then, provides the first theoretical analysis of this connection. We are thus able to suggest potential auction design improvements for existing cap-and-trade markets that incorporate allowance reserves.
The article is structured as follows. In Section 2 we provide a formal model of the auction mechanism with and without an allowance reserve. In Section 3 we detail the relative merits and drawbacks of an allowance reserve within a permit auction. Section 4 extends the model to asymmetric marginal valuations as well as decreasing valuations. Section 5 provides some policy implications for the RGGI auctions. Section 6 provides some concluding remarks. All proofs are provided in the Appendix.
The model

Preliminaries
Consider a cap-and-trade market that consists of an index set of firms I = {1, 2, . . . , n}. The regulator of this market has an aggregate emissions target of Q ∈ + and initially allocates a corresponding number of pollution permits via a permit auction.
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Suppose firms have a marginal value of v for each pollution permit, which is common knowledge to all firms but not the regulator.
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This assumption is made for tractability of the analysis, however we show later in the article (Section 4) that our main results still hold when we allow for asymmetric permit valuations and decreasing marginal valuations. Although the regulator does not know v, it knows v is distributed according to some distribution function F (.) with the support [v,v] . F is twice differentiable and has a continuous density f < ∞.
The regulator sells the Q permits via an uniform-price sealed-bid auction with a reserve price r > 0. Similar to existing cap-and-trade markets, the regulator also has an allowance reserve of permits, which can be released to the auction if the clearing price reaches a certain threshold. Formally, denote the allowance reserve asQ ≡Q − Q > 0, whereQ is the maximum supply of permits. The regulator commits to the following permit supply schedule: if the clearing price is higher than a trigger price, denotedp, then the regulator releases more permits (up toQ > 0) in order to reduce the market-clearing price towardsp.
Our auction game is structured as follows. First, the regulator announces {Q,Q,p, r}. Second, firms submit permit demand schedules. There are two possible scenarios that can occur: (i) the clearing price is p * ≤p and (ii) the clearing price p * >p. In the first case, all bids higher than the clearing price would 9 As our focus here is on how existing institutional auction designs affect participating firms, we abstract from the regulator's objective function. We do, however, provide analysis of revenue maximization later in the article. 10 The marginal value v is the avoided marginal costs of reducing pollution. We thus follow the realistic construction of marginal abatement costs (e.g., Mckinsey and Company, 2016) and assume that firms have long-run marginal abatement cost curves that are globally convex but discontinuous because of alternative technology classes that increase in (marginal) cost. In other words, the marginal abatement cost function is a step function where marginal costs are constant for specific technology classes but discontinuously jump when adopting new technologies.
receive their submitted quantities and pay p * : the allowance reserve is not utilized. In the second case, the regulator releases more permits until either the clearing price becomes equal top or the whole extra permits exhausts.
An auction mechanism without an allowance reserve
, which is decreasing and left continuous. The aggregate demand is the sum of individual demand functions, such that (p, v) . Given demand schedules and a quantity of permits Q for sale in auction, the clearing price is,
If there is no price higher than r that satisfies the above condition, then the clearing price becomes the reserve price r. In this case, at least some of the total supply of permits will not be allocated. Now it is possible that the aggregate demand becomes discontinuous or flat at some points including p *
. If the demand is flat at p * then we have excess demand at the clearing price and the extra demand must be rationed. In particular, a discontinuity in each firm's demand at any price p can be defined by
, where p is any price greater than p. Aggregating over all firms determines this discontinuity for the total demand schedule, which we denote by v) . Using this we can derive firm i's permit allocation,
Firm i's equilibrium initial allocation of permits equals their permits received from their individual demand schedule at the clearing price d i (p * , v) minus the pro rata reduction of permits due to excess demand (if any). That is, the ratio on the right hand side is the total excess demand (D(p * , v) − Q) multiplied by the proportion of discontinuity (excess demand) for firm i relative to all firms v) . Given the clearing price and the equilibrium quantity, each firm pays the total amount of p * q * i (p * , v) for all permits received. Therefore, the payoff function for firm i ∈ I, given a clearing price p * , is
We first begin by analyzing the equilibrium demand schedules when the supply of permits is fixed at the level Q. For a fixed supply of permits, if the regulator sets a reserve price r ≤ v, then there are equilibria of the uniform-price auction in which the regulator could do the same by canceling the auction and setting a fixed price v for all units (Back and Zender, 1993) . To avoid such equilibria we focus on those cases with r > v. The following proposition is adapted from Back and Zender (1993) .
Proposition 1 (Back and Zender (1993) 
where
n and each firm receives Q n permits.
Proposition 1 suggests that there exists a continuum of equilibrium prices that can lie between the reserve price and v. There are some notable points about this result. First, as shown in Back and Zender (1993) , even if each bidder has her own independent private signal regarding the marginal value v, we still have the same set of equilibria and the result remains unchanged. Indeed, this class of equilibria is independent of bidders private signals. Second, since any price between [r, v] could characterize an equilibrium with the same final permit allocation Q n , any rational firm prefers to pay less.
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Therefore, the most likely prediction is the lowest possible price, that is, the reserve price r. In fact, a clearing price equal to r is Pareto dominant equilibrium for all firms. The last point raises a major concern for those auctions without a reserve price (or a small reserve price) as the clearing price can potentially end up very low. We now turn to consider how these classes of equilibria change when a regulator implements an allowance reserve.
An auction mechanism with an allowance reserve
Suppose the regulator announces their target level Q of permits for the auction followed by the commitment to increase the supply with the allowance reserveQ if the clearing price is greater thañ p. This mechanism design is similar to the mechanism within the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). One clear observation is that ifp is greater than or equal to v, nothing will change: firms would never pay a price above their marginal valuations. From this point forward we supposep < v unless it is explicitly stated otherwise. 
As shown in Figure 1 (a) suppose the aggregate demand is D(p). Then given the permits Q, a clearing price exists at p * . There are three possibilities for wherep lies with respect to p * . Ifp is above p * (for 11 Our aim in this article is to focus on the consequences for the clearing price when an allowance exists, as such our focus is not on the individual firm permit allocation. If it was, then it would be possible to incorporate financial capacity constraints for all firms, which would generate asymmetric post-auction permit holdings.
example,p h ), then no further supply would be released and firms with bids higher than the clearing price would receive their permits and pay p * . Ifp is below p * , two possible cases can happen: (i) p l ≤p < p * (for example,p m ), where p l is the price in which the aggregate demand is equal toQ and (ii)p < p l . In the first case, the quantity of permits sold in the auction increases to a point within the interval [Q,Q] and the clearing price becomesp. Note that ifp = p l the allowance reserve is fully exhausted atQ. In the second case, the quantity of permits sold will increase toQ (the reserve is fully exhausted) but the reserve quantity is not enough to reduce the clearing price top and the clearing price becomes greater thanp. This illustrates the potential complexity of this supply scheme.
To further assist in our understanding of the supply scheme, observe Figure 1(b) , which depicts a number of potential demand schedules. As shown in Figure 1(b), D(p) is the case where submitted demand and supply intersect at a point abovep, but below v, D 1 (p) is a case where demand is "too low" with a clearing price p * belowp, and D 2 (p) is a case where demand is "too high". As can be observed, p * * is the highest threshold price in which the addition of an allowance reserve can reduce the clearing price top. It is important to mention that p * * can be larger than v but as long as v is abovep the analysis remains the same. When the demand is "too high", such as D 2 (p), thenv is the highest threshold price in which the addition of an allowance reserve would result in the clearing price being equal to firms' valuations v. Of course, for prices abovev firms' demands are zero.
We now provide an equilibrium characterization of the auction with allowance reserve. 
where Theorem 1 characterizes a continuum of equilibria that includes any clearing price between [r,p]. There are numerous demand functions that can characterize equilibria like the one in (5). In fact, one can show any decreasing left continuous function γ(p) with γ(p * * ) =Q n , can characterize similar symmetric equilibria as long as the residual supply left for a bidder is flat enough for prices greater than p * * and steep enough for prices lower than p * * . Such characterization can be observed in Section 4 where we extend the model to asymmetric values. However, for all these functions the set of equilibrium clearing prices and the quantity each firm receives would remain the same.
Comparing Theorem 1 with Proposition 1 highlights the structural differences when an allowance reserve is incorporated into the auction. The introduction of the allowance reserve augments the firms' demand schedules in such a way as to separate between the emissions target Q and the allowance reservȇ Q. Further, Theorem 1 proves that p * >p cannot constitute an equilibrium in the current setting. To observe a clearing price greater thanp, it must be the case that the whole reserve quantity is released and is not enough to reduce the price top. Such cases would happen for clearing prices above p * * -the maximum price in which the extra permits are enough to reduce the clearing price top -which are too high for firms to increase their payoffs.
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According to Theorem 1, each firm i receives Q n for p * <p andQ n for p * =p. The implication of this result is significant. This shows that-in any equilibria-if we observe a clearing price ofp then it is the case that all the extra quantity is used. Indeed, in all other equilibria, the allowance reserve is left completely unused with a clearing price belowp. Consider, for a moment, the observable real world outcomes of the RGGI auctions with an allowance reserve. As we have seen in Table 1 , Auction 23 (Q1 2014) and 29 (Q3 2015) resulted in the CCR being released. In both cases, the CCR was entirely exhausted and the clearing price is in line with our predictions (i.e., equal to the trigger price). This is, in a sense, good news for the regulator: the aim of the allowance reserve is to prevent prices being greater thanp. However, as we will prove in Section 3, obtaining this target via an allowance reserve is not necessarily desirable. The result in Theorem 1 gives us an important clue to analyze when there is a higher chance of observing a clearing price equal top or below. The intuition of Lemma 1 suggests even when the reserve is released there are conditions where firms' payoffs are lower. Given firms' payoffs are lower under a released allowance reserve it suggests firms bid in such a way to avoid activating the allowance reserve. This then means that we are more likely to observe equilibria with smaller clearing prices, which makes the extra supply schedule analogous to an auction without an allowance reserve.
Lemma 1. Given a value v, if there exists ap
There are some comparative statics of this result which are important to mention. First, it is clear that the greater thep, the higher the chance that the extra supply becomes unused. However, when Q Q becomes larger, then there is a greater chance of having a clearing price equal top and the whole reserve supply being used. This obviously holds for the case with v >p. Remember, however, that v is not known to the regulator who setsp and it is possible to havep greater than v. In that case it is clear that the equilibrium is p * ∈ [r, v] and the extra supply would never be used.
Evaluating the relative merits of allowance reserves in permit auctions
In this section we compare the outcomes of auctions with and without an allowance reserve. We begin analyzing if the auction with an allowance reserve and trigger price could potentially reduce the cost to firms, given the current setting. As our aim is to consider how the existing institutional auction design may affect firms, there is no requirement to model the objective function of the regulator. Indeed, in reality, it is unclear as to the regulator's objective. There can be a host of possible objectives, for example, to maximize revenue (to provide public goods or in the case of RGGI, energy efficiency schemes), to maximize social welfare, improve allocative efficiency or to simply contain abatement costs (e.g., Cramton and Kerr, 2002) . To provide some highlight, we do consider the optimal auction design for a regulator that is concerned about revenue maximization.
Cost containment
The primary goal of an allowance reserve is to contain firms' cost within a cap-and-trade market. Due to unexpected cost shocks in the economy, the permit market may experience levels of increased price volatility and potentially higher levels of compliance costs. Our purpose in this subsection is to consider the implications of the allowance reserve on firms' cost (payoffs) within the auction. To do this we want to hold target-level environmental stringency constant and compare firms' payoffs when they can obtainQ permits without an allowance versus an allowance reserve that first distributes Q thenQ if the initial clearing price reaches the trigger price.
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The following proposition shows that, in many cases, the allowance reserve actually reduces firms' payoffs.
Proposition 2. For a permit allocation ofQ, there exists a class of symmetric equilibria in which the auction without an allowance reserve is Pareto superior for firms relative to the auction with an allowance reserve.
Proposition 2 shows that any equilibria with p * ∈ [r,p) are Pareto superior to the auction with an allowance reserve. Thus Proposition 2 holds for a large class of equilibria. The only class of equilibria in the auction that remains to be discussed is p * ∈ [p, v] . Note that, for an auction without an allowance reserve, Proposition 1 suggests the most likely prediction is the Pareto superior clearing price p * = r. Thus even for a potentially large continuum of prices, the equilibrium clearing price is likely to be pushed down towards the reserve price: Proposition 2 is therefore still applicable. Only if the equilibrium clearing price in the auction remains Pareto inferior for firms (i.e., p * ∈ [p, v]) will payoffs be higher under an auction with allowance reserve. As we will illustrate in Section 5, the evidence from RGGI auctions appears to confirm our predictions in Proposition 2. 14 One possible explanation for Proposition 2 is that the permit supply in the auction is larger than or equal to the supply in the allowance reserve regime; thus, firms' payoffs are higher (prices are lower). There is a problem with such intuition: it implicitly assumes that firms' demand schedules are invariant to changes in the supply schedule. Yet this is incorrect. We have shown in Theorem 1 and Proposition 2, that the demand schedules endogenously change when an allowance reserve is included. To highlight these differences further, we can compare regimes with potentially different environmental stringency (Q (Q) for an auction with(out) an allowance reserve).
Corollary 1. For everyp ∈ [r,p) such thatp < v −Q Q (v −p), an auction with an allowance reserve is weakly dominated by an auction without an allowance reserve and quantity Q.
We now show for the same class of equilibria discussed above, the impact of an allowance reserve on the aggregate cost of pollution reduction, which is derived by calculating the area under the demand schedule and to the right ofQ.
Corollary 2. For a permit allocation ofQ, there exists a class of symmetric equilibria in which the auction with an allowance reserve has higher aggregate pollution abatement costs relative to an auction without an allowance reserve.
Corollary 2 shows that for our class of symmetric equilibria, pollution reduction costs are lower when no allowance reserve is implemented. The inclusion of an allowance reserve may therefore not contain costs within a permit auction. 13 We also provide conditions in Corollary 1 under which the auction with tighter environmental stringency Q <Q weakly dominates the auction with an allowance reserve and emissionsQ.
14 We abstract from introducing exogenous shocks (uncertainty) to the demand schedule. The inclusion of cost shocks is common practice in the cost-containment literature, as without cost shocks there would be no requirement for an allowance reserve. Note, however, that introducing cost shocks here will not alter our results. For an objective comparison, regimes with and without allowance reserves should be subject to identical cost shocks. As such, this has the consequence of altering the demand schedules for both cases in an identical manner.
Clearing prices and maximizing auction revenue
The regulatory objective of cost containment is clearly important for the development of cap-and-trade markets. Yet the generation (and maximization) of auction revenue is also another objective that we must consider. Indeed, the generation of periodic and stable revenue is becoming increasingly important: one can observe from many permit markets that auction revenues are earmarked to provide investment in new clean technologies, energy efficiency programs, and so on (see, for example, RGGI, 2015) .
The next proposition characterizes a condition under which the regulator could guarantee a minimum clearing price.
Proposition 3. If r >v −Q Q (v −p) then there exists a class of symmetric equilibria where:
• in the auction with an allowance reserve the clearing pricep is Pareto superior for firms,
• in the auction without an allowance reserve the clearing price of r is Pareto superior for firms.
Therefore, there is a higher probability to observe larger clearing prices in an auction with an allowance reserve compared to an auction without an allowance reserve with all available unitsQ.
For the allowance reserve regime, Proposition 3 shows that there are two effects on firms' payoffs when the equilibrium clearing price isp. First, there is a negative effect because firms pay a higher price. Second, there is a positive effect, which is the release of the extra quantity of permits and thus a larger share for each firm. Proposition 3 shows a class of equilibria under which the net effect on payoffs is positive: accordingly, firms prefer a clearing price ofp. Also the above proposition suggests that the regulator can implement {r,p, Q,Q} in such a way-even with incomplete information on v-that encourages firms to increase their submitted demands in an auction with an allowance reserve. In this case, unlike the auction without allowance reserve, where the seller has no instruments except the reserve price, the regulator would expect a higher clearing price and therefore larger revenue if the marginal value is greater than a thresholdṽ, which is determined by r =ṽ −Q Q (ṽ −p).
The above result investigates the conditions where the regulator-by choice of an appropriate reserve price-can generate a larger clearing price with the inclusion of an allowance reserve. This result, however, can be interpreted from a broader perspective. As in most permit auctions, the reserve price (and any per annum increase) is usually fixed at the beginning of auction design. For example under RGGI the reserve price was set at the outset and increases at 2.5% per annum indefinitely. In absence of any routine review process, there will exist inertia within the regulatory system, where the value of reserve price is not always desirable.
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Thus it is feasible that the inequality r >v −Q Q (v −p) may hold due to adjustments and shocks to v (and its bounds [v,v] ) rather than deliberate regulatory design. Thus it is perfectly feasible to observe higher clearing prices when an allowance reserve is implemented simply by the existence of an 'unresponsive' reserve price. For the RGGI application, the 2016 variables arep = $8 per CO 2 allowance, r = $2.10 per CO 2 allowance,Q = 10 million allowances, and Q ≈ 15 million allowances. Thus using the above inequality, shows that ifv > $16.85 per CO 2 allowance then the results in Proposition 3 hold. This, in the current institutional context, is quite plausible.
Although the choice of reserve price is the most obvious transmission mechanism that alters the clearing price, the regulator can also adjust the allowance reserve without changing the maximum level of permitsQ.
Corollary 3. For any positive quantityQ andp <v, the regulator can adjust the size of the allowance reserve such that r >v −Q Q (v −p).
Corollary 3 shows the importance of the allowance reserve level, or the ratio ofQ Q , in this environment. In fact, if the regulator wants to maximize revenue, it-only with the adjustment of the reserve quantitycan generate the conditions for a larger clearing price. Again, using the RGGI application for the 2016 parameters, it can be easily shown that the regulator can obtain the desired outcome ifQ Q >v −2.10 v−8 . As the current ratio isQ Q ≈ 1.67, it is quite plausible that the results in Corollary 3 could hold in this context.
Optimal trigger price
One of the key instruments in the current setting is the trigger price. In fact, in reality, trigger prices may be more adjustable than any other variable from the regulator's perspective. An interesting question is what would be the optimal trigger price if the regulator wanted to maximize revenue? Although there are several possibilities for the equilibrium clearing price in the current setting, we use a max-min approach to identify the optimal trigger price. In particular, we consider the worst possible clearing price in the event that the extra supply is not released and then maximize the seller's objective function. When the extra supply is released there is only one equilibrium clearing price which isp. The following proposition characterizes an optimal trigger price, given the current reserve allowance scheme.
Proposition 4. Suppose the regulator's objective is to maximize revenue under the reserve allowance scheme. Then the optimal trigger price is the one that satisfies
where M =Qp
Proposition 4 shows that to maximize revenue the optimal trigger price should be set such that the allowance reserveQ is equal to the hazard rate, where M =Qp −Qȓ Q . Note that from RGGI 2016 parameters (Q = 10,Q = 10, r = 2.10), if we supposev = $28 per ton of CO 2 allowance and v is distributed uniformly on [0, 28], then the optimal trigger price becomesp ≈ $8. Thus, it is feasible that the actual optimal trigger price in RGGI is maximizing the regulator's auction revenue. Further note that the condition in Proposition 3 is also satisfied with these numbers and therefore, the regulator not only optimizes the trigger price to maximize revenue but also sets the parameters such thatp becomes the Pareto superior clearing price for firms. Here we fix a reserve price and derive the optimal condition for the trigger price. Now, however, consider a case where the trigger price is set together with the reserve price to maximize the regulator's revenue.
Proposition 5. Suppose the regulator's objective is to maximize revenue under the reserve allowance scheme, then the reserve price must be set equal to the trigger price, and the condition in (6) becomes,
Proposition 5 is intuitive. First, the reserve price cannot be larger than the trigger price. Second, as the reserve price increases then the higher the chance that the extra quantity would be released and the clearing price becomes the trigger price. Therefore, a reserve price equal to the trigger price is the optimal choice of the regulator to increase revenue. This result appears to be out of line with the experiences in RGGI. Note that both the reserve price and the trigger price were set at different stages of the regulation process: the reserve price was set at the creation of the scheme and the trigger price was chosen approximately seven years later. Thus, in this case, Proposition 4 provides the realistic experience of RGGI where the trigger price is set given a fixed reserve price. We now provide further discussion on the RGGI auctions.
Asymmetric valuations
In this section we investigate how sensitive our results are to the assumption of symmetric values among firms. First, let us start by assuming that there are two types of firms, low type and high type. Each low-type firm has a marginal value equal to v l while each high-type firm has a marginal value equal to v h for permits with 0 < v l < v h <v. Types and values are common knowledge among firms but the regulator only knows l number of firms are low type and the rest are high types. The following Proposition extends the result of Proposition 1.
Proposition 6. When there are two types of firms,
• for any price p
there is a class of symmetric equilibria where both types demand permits.
• for any pricep
there is a class of symmetric equilibria where only high-type firms demand permits and low-type firms demand zero.
As in Proposition 1, we continue to observe that demand reduction still exists, and there are equilbria in which the clearing price is very low. However, there is a class of equilibria where the price is too high for low-type firms, and they exit the auction. One can still show the condition under which the demand reduction equilibrium remains Pareto dominant for all firms.
We now want to extend the results of Theorem 1 to a case with asymmetric values. Suppose the regulator chooses a trigger pricep and an allowance reserveQ as we defined earlier in the article. Since the regulator does not know v l and v h , there are three possibilities for whichp could be compared to v l and v h . First, ifp > v h , then nothing changes compared to a case without allowance reserve. Second, if v l <p < v h , then obviously low-type firms would never receive any amount of the extra supply. In this case, the class of equilibria with clearing prices lower than v l exist and is similar to the one in Proposition 6. For prices above v l the result of Theorem 1 remains unchanged but with one difference that only high-type firms are active. Finally, ifp < v l < v h the following Proposition characterizes the new set of equilibria.
Proposition 7. Ifp < v l < v h then, for any price p * ∈ [0,p], there exist a class of symmetric equilibria such that:
• for equilibrium prices p * <p no allowance reserve is used,
• for an equilibrium price p * =p, the allowance reserve is completely exhausted.
This section extends the assumption of the original model to a case where firms have asymmetric values for permits. As results show, there are no significant changes in the set of equilibria. In particular, the introduction of allowance reserve would not change the result of Theorem 1. Therefore, the allowance reserve is used in only one instance (and fully exhausted), where the equilibrium clearing price is equal to the trigger price. It is important to note that this analysis can easily be extended to more than than two types without any loss in results. One major point is that with many asymmetric types, the result of Theorem 1 still holds and the allowance reserve is only used in an equilibrium price equal to the trigger price.
Another major implication is to note that even if firm's marginal values are not constant for all units, we can extend the result of Theorem 1. To see this, suppose firms have access to multiple abatement technologies in the short term and therefore their demand for permits are diminishing but in a discrete fashion. This demand can be shown as an step function, and each step of this function can be treated as a separate firm with a different type. Therefore, even if firms have decreasing marginal values, the set of equilibria with the maximum clearing price equal to the trigger price remains unchanged. In particular, the only instance where the allowance reserve is used, is the one with a clearing price equal to the trigger price and the reserve allowance is used completely. This is also intuitive: if firms increase their demand beyondp, they have incentives to increase it up to a point where the entire allowance reserve is released because the price they pay is not affected while they receive more permits and consequently higher payoffs.
Policy implications: RGGI auction prices
In this section we further relate our results and predictions to the US Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). As discussed earlier in this article, RGGI has a similar structure to what we have modeled here. In fact, it can be readily stated that for 2016:p = $8 per CO 2 allowance,Q = 10 million allowances, and r = $2.10 per CO 2 allowance. Figure 2 provides the reserve and clearing prices for all 30 RGGI auctions from 2008-2015 (inclusive) . Also, as indicated in Figure 2 , the Cost Containment Reserve (CCR) was established after Auction 22. As can be observed from Figure 2 , the clearing price was identical to the reserve price from Auction 9 to 18 (inclusive). In many of these cases there was excess supply of permits in the auction. However, there did exist instances in which the clearing price was equal to the reserve with no excess supply (for example, auction 11). Our analysis appears to be consistent when the Cost Containment Reserve (CCR) was established: when the CCR was used, the entire reserve was exhausted and the clearing price was consistent with the regulator's threshold trigger price (Theorem 1). The establishment of the CCR is in an ideal position for us to consider the true cost containment feature of an allowance reserve. Simple observation shows that even when the CCR was active, prices continued to rise exponentially. Factors that may have affected the clearing price within this time-frame are, for example, US legislation on regulating greenhouse gases, the realization of any potential aggregate shocks as well as the tightening of the cap (reduced in 2014 and reducing by 2.5% per annum for 2015-2020). 16 Further, other possible explanations do exist. For example, if the trigger price is reached, this may indicate that prices are likely to be at least as high in future auctions. Thus firms may have an incentive to 'hoard' permits and, as a result, the entire CCR is exhausted.
Given our predictions in Theorem 1, another possible factor can be suggested for the increase in clearing prices. Along with the tightening of the aggregate cap by 2.5% per annum, the regulator has also established a precedent of significant increases in the trigger price: fixed percentage increases of the trigger prices were set at 50% (2014) (2015) , 33% (2015-2016), 25% (2016-2017) , then 2.5% thereafter. Thus our analysis suggests that such large increases in the trigger price are potentially placing upward pressure on the clearing price. Observing the regulator's choice of increasing trigger prices, it illustrates the potential for a paradoxical result: the regulator, in an attempt to contain costs may, in fact, increase auction compliance costs. As Proposition 3 shows, under realistic conditions, the regulator's choice of a high trigger price will turn out to be the firms' Pareto superior clearing price and this is likely to be higher than a corresponding clearing price in an auction without allowance reserve.
We would advocate, given our predictions, that the regulator either set Q orQ but discontinue the allowance reserve in its current format. As we proved earlier, setting a cap ofQ is likely to be more effective in reducing the clearing price than setting Q with an allowance reserveQ. If the regulator's main objective is to strictly control prices, then we suggest that focus is placed on choosing an optimal reserve price. An alternative method is to provide an unlimited allowance reserve. A major drawback, however, is that an unlimited reserve is void of any quantitative restriction on pollution.
Concluding remarks
The purpose of this article is to investigate permit auctions with allowance reserves. A permit allowance reserve is a fixed stock of permits that can be released by the regulator if the clearing price reaches a threshold trigger price. Allowance reserves are justified due to their apparent assistance in reducing price volatility within the permit market and, as a consequence, reducing the net present value of compliance costs (e.g., Murray et al., 2009; Fell et al., 2012) .
In this article we model a uniform-price multi-unit auction with and without a permit allowance reserve. We show that there is a class of symmetric subgame-perfect equilibria in which all firms have lower payoffs when the auction format includes a permit allowance reserve. Consequentially, and paradoxically, an allowance reserve with the aim of reducing firms' costs (increasing payoffs) may actually do the opposite. The existence of the allowance reserve distorts firms' equilibrium bidding strategies in such a way that it is entirely possible that the market clearing price is higher under the inclusion of an allowance reserve. This suggests that the justifications for using a cost containment reserve may have to be revised in light of our results. In terms of the US Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), our results suggest that the Cost Containment Reserve (CCR), should, in many cases, be discontinued in its current format. As the auction mechanism provides the market with price signals, a distortion within these prices may have substantial consequences for the RGGI auction and secondary market.
We do not call for the complete disbandment of all cost containment reserves. Indeed, a point to note is that our analysis has focused on the auction. Thus it may, in the vein of Murray et al. (2009) , still be feasible to justify cost containment reserves within the market. However, we suggest that any regulator be wary of the potential side effects of an allowance reserve within the auction mechanism.
Appendix Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. See Back and Zender (1993) Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Suppose all other firms except firm i follow the demand schedule in (5). Then the residual supply for firm i is the difference between the total available quantity and the sum of demands of all other (n − 1) firms. We know that the total quantity could be any amount greater or equal to Q and up toQ, depending on the initial clearing price. If the clearing price is less thanp, then the total quantity would be Q, and if the clearing price is greater but still less than p * * then a proportion of the extra quantity would be released. Finally, if the clearing price is greater or equal to p * * then the total quantityQ would be released. Given this supply schedule the residual supply for firm i, x i (p), is as follows.
If the price is higher thanv, no other firm demands any quantity and therefore the residual quantity for firm i is the whole quantity. This is because even if the reserve quantity is released the final price never falls below v. If the price is between p * * andv then the residual supply shown above is the result of the subtraction of the demand on (n − 1) bidders (line two of (5)) from the total quantityQ for such prices. Firm i's payoff is therefore,
which is decreasing in p for prices above p * * . Therefore, this term is maximized at p = p * * , where each firm receives a quantity ofQ n . The final clearing price would also fall top.
For prices betweenp and p * * , the reserve quantity will be released and always reduces the final clearing price top. In fact, in this scenario firm i can submit a demand anywhere between [0,Q n ], but quantityQ n is the most desirable quantity. Now if p * < p <p the calculation for residual supply left for bidder i gives us the equation in line four of (8). Then firm i's payoff is, 
Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. Consider two possible equilibria for the auction with an allowance: (i) p * ∈ [r,p) and (ii) p * =p. In case (i) the allowance reserve is not activated and both clearing price and quantity of permits are identical to the auction without an allowance reserve. For case (ii) whenp ∈ [r,p) such that p < v −Q Q (v −p) is satisfied, using Lemma 1 we can conclude that firms have larger payoffs in an auction without an allowance reserve even though they receive lower quantities.
Proof of Corollary 2
Proof. First, focus on the class of equilibria of Proposition 2 for an auction without an allowance reserve. Denote D(0, v) as the aggregate demand of the unconstrained level of emissions. From Proposition 2 if p * ∈ [r,p), then total emissions released would be equal to Q in an auction with an allowance reserve, andQ in an auction without an allowance reserve. Given D(0, v) and the demand schedule is downward sloping, it follows that the aggregate pollution abatement costs are higher under an auction with an allowance reserve. If p * =p in an auction with an allowance reserve then equilibria of both auctions would result in the same total quantity ofQ. However, in an auction without the allowance reserve the class of equilibria we discuss constitutes a clearing price strictly lower thanp. Therefore, given D(0, v) and the demand schedule is downward sloping, it follows that the aggregate pollution abatement costs are higher under an auction with an allowance reserve.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. First, rewrite the condition in Lemma 1 for the smallest possible equilibrium clearing price, the reserve price, which is the worst outcome for the regulator:
Now fixp and quantities, then the right hand side would reach its minimum atv −Q Q (v −p). So if the regulator sets the reserve price such that it becomes greater than the minimum then by continuity, there must be some v <v, which also makes the right hand side less than r. Therefore, if r >v −Q Q (v −p), then there exist aṽ <v such that we have,
For any value v ∈ [ṽ,v], firms prefer the clearing pricep with the share ofQ n permits. So there is a higher chance of observingp as the clearing price compared to any other clearing price p * ∈ [r,p). For the case without allowance reserve, it has already been shown that for p * ∈ [r, v] , the Pareto superior clearing price is r.
Proof of Corollary 3
Proof. The reserve quantity by definition isQ − Q. If the regulator keeps almost all quantities as the reserve thenQ Q goes to infinity. Sincev is a positive finite number then we must have r >v −Q Q (v −p) for any positive r. Now by continuity, there exists aQ <Q, such that r =v −Q Q (v −p). Therefore, the regulator can set the reserve quantity to any amount greater thanQ −Q and guarantee the condition in Proposition 3. According to condition (II), the above term is negative for prices higher than p * and positive for prices lower than p * . Thus p * is the best response of firm i. Remember that we did not limit the type of firm i and this proof works for both types.
The proof of the second part is quite similar but now for prices above v l low-type firms leave the market. Therefore, in equilibrium, the quantity share for each firm becomes Q h , where h is the number of high type firms. Also condition (III) can now change to {γ(p)|x(p) < (v h − p)x (p) for p <p * }.
Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. The first part of the proof is similar to Proposition 6 given thatp is less than v l . So each firm receives a quantity equal to Q n in equilibrium. Now imagine a case where the price goes abovep. According to the rules of the game the allowance reserve or the extra supply would increase until either the price goes back top or the extra supply finishes. With a similar argument to the one in Theorem 1 we can argue that a demand schedule that results in releasing only a part of the extra supply cannot be an equilibrium. The argument is based on the fact that if firms increase their demands marginally then the price would remain the same but the quantity they receive increases. Thus their total payoff increases if they increase the demand. Define p * * as the highest price such that the extra supply can reduce the price top. A demand schedule γ(p) constitutes an equilibrium if, 
Differentiating this payoff with respect to p yields,
A representative firm i would have no incentive to deviate from γ(p). According to (II), for prices higher than p * * their payoff is decreasing and for prices below p * * their payoff is increasing.
